The rise of new farmer cooperatives in China; evidence from Hubei Province by Bijman, J. & Hu, D.
The Rise of New Farmer Cooperatives in China:
Evidence from Hubei Province1
JOS BIJMAN2 AND DINGHUAN HU3
Abstract
Since the late 1990s, the number of farmer cooperatives in China has
rapidly grown. The adoption of the national law on farmer professional
cooperatives in 2007 has led to significant governmental support for the
establishment and management of farmer professional cooperatives. This
paper explores the organizational features of the newly established
cooperatives as well as the services they provide to their members.
Particular attention is given to the role of local entrepreneurs in grouping
farmers and in acquiring support from local and regional state agencies. The
paper is based on data about a group of 200 agriculture and aquaculture
cooperatives in Hubei Province, central China.
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Introduction
Markets for agricultural products are rapidly changing in China. At least two
major developments in agrifood markets are pushing for structural change in the
agricultural sector, particularly affecting small producers (World Bank, 2006a:13).
First, increased consumer sophistication means that consumers are no longer
content with a limited choice of products or seasonal availability and have a
growing awareness of food safety issues. Second, the rise of supermarkets as
major food outlets is resulting in supply chain restructuring, which may make it
more difficult for small farmers to compete. These developments put small
farmers at a disadvantage compared to large farmers, state-farming companies,
and foreign suppliers.
Economic collective-action organizations can help small farmers to pool
resources in order to access the specific assets needed for production, achieve
economies of scale or scope, and gain bargaining power to negotiate with buyers
(Holloway et al., 2000). In addition, producer organizations can provide technical
assistance to their members, make available market information, and help their
members in storing and transporting perishable products. In other words, producer
organizations can reduce the transaction costs that are often problematic for small
farmers when they want to participate in high quality value chains. A number of
authors have found that producer organizations, producer groups, or cooperatives
facilitate small farmer participation in high-value supply chains, particularly in
fresh produce markets (Roy and Thorat, 2008; Narrod et al., 2009; Blandon et al.,
2009). However, this optimism is not shared by everyone, as agricultural producer
organizations may have organizational features that hamper quality improvement
(Francesconi and Ruben, 2007) or only lead to quality enhancement under
particular institutional conditions (Hellin et al., 2009).
In China, for a long time economic producer organizations were almost absent.
Since the centrally planned marketing system for agricultural products was
abolished in the 1980s, most farmers have been selling their products to small
traders and small wholesalers. According to Huang et al. (2008), this is still the
dominant situation for marketing of fruits and vegetables in most of rural China.
While farmer marketing cooperatives started to appear in some parts of China in
the late 1990s, due to local government initiatives to promote collective
marketing, their number began to increase nation-wide only after the introduction of
the 2007 law on promotion of farmer cooperatives. This law has the explicit
objective of strengthening the rural economy by supporting the establishment of
marketing cooperatives. Such cooperatives can link small farmers to traders,
processors, and retailers downstream in the value chain, including modern value
chains catering to high-quality markets. In addition, these cooperatives can provide
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farmers with bargaining power in increasingly concentrated food markets, thus
furthering the equitable distribution of the benefits in the value chain.
State support plays an important role in establishing new marketing
cooperatives. However, these new cooperatives are not necessarily state-driven or
organized top-down. While organizing farmers in state-initiated and state-managed
cooperatives has a long history of failure, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Hussi et al., 1993), China is following a different model. In China the initiative to
establish a cooperative comes from one or more entrepreneurial persons with access
to the financial capital, the human capital, and the social capital needed to establish
a successful marketing organizations. These entrepreneurs can be farmers, or they
can be traders, extension officers, or managers of a processing company.
As one of the goals of state support for cooperatives is to establish linkages
between farmer cooperatives and supermarkets, quality issues are crucial.
Supermarkets generally have higher quality requirements than other market outlets.
While supermarkets have been rapidly rising in China (Hu et al., 2004), small
farmers often have difficulty in complying with the quality standards that
supermarkets require from their suppliers. Cooperatives, however, can be the
intermediary organization that enables small farmers to enhance the quality of their
products.
The objective of this paper is to describe and analyze the organizational
characteristics and the functional activities of a group of newly established Farmer
Professional Cooperatives (FPCs). One of our key questions is related to the impact
of organizational characteristics on quality improvement. We use a unique set of
data from almost 200 cooperatives from Hubei Province, Central China. As the
provincial Ministry of Agriculture, through its Supervision Office for Rural
Professional Cooperative Organizations (SORC), is actively supporting the
establishment of the new FPCs, we were particularly interested in studying the
impact of this state support. We found a positive correlation between state support
and the application of food quality standards by the cooperatives.
The main contributions of this article are the following. First, it provides a
detailed description of a large group of newly established farmer marketing
cooperatives in one of the important agricultural provinces of central China (Hubei
Province). We explore the organizational characteristics of the new cooperatives,
as well as the services these cooperatives provide to their members. Such
description, to our knowledge, is not available in the English language literature.
Second, we explore the role of the different entrepreneurs in establishing the
cooperatives. These entrepreneurs have diverse backgrounds, but all have been
able to establish good relationships with public officials. Third, we provide
information on the type of state support the cooperatives are receiving, with
particular attention for quality improvement issues.
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The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the rise of
new farmer cooperatives in China, with special attention to the supporting role
of the new national law on promoting Farmer Professional Cooperatives
(FPCs). After that we present our data and provide descriptive and correlation
analysis on the organizational features of the new cooperatives, as well as on
the services the cooperatives provide. Special attention is given to quality issues.
We conclude with a discussion on our findings.
Agricultural cooperatives in China
In the 1980s, collective farming was gradually transformed into family-based
farming. With the abolition of the state-run Unified Procurement and Sales System
in 1985, markets were fully liberalized for fruits and vegetables, pork, seafood, eggs,
and other agricultural products (with the exclusion of cotton and grain). Different
marketing channels developed for these products, with farmers themselves,
government agencies, traditional cooperatives, state farms, and private traders all
becoming marketing enterprises. Wet markets (i.e., open-air fresh-produce
markets), which were under restriction during the planned economy, came back to
life soon after the reform. In addition, wholesale markets and professional traders
rapidly expanded their business, as interregional trade was fully liberalized.
Despite the reforms in China’s agrifood markets and the establishment of
efficient supply chains servicing wholesale and retail markets, the market position of
the majority of small farmers did not improve much. Most of the 200 million small
farmers in China continue to produce low-quality products using traditional
production methods. The average size of the Chinese farm was 0.6 hectare in 2008
(Deng et al., 2010). Linkages between farmers and end consumers continue to be
very weak, with farmers obtaining limited information on consumer demands. The
vertical coordination needed for complying with increasingly stringent food quality
and safety standards is still lacking (World Bank, 2006b). Most small farmers have
limited options to benefit from the increasing demand for high-value or specialty
products by domestic middle-class and foreign consumers. In order to strengthen
market access and quality improvement by small farmers, the government began to
promote farmer associations and farmer cooperatives at the end of the 1990s.
The first serious effort to promote farmer cooperatives came in 1998 (Deng et
al., 2010). The State Council issued a Directive for government support for
cooperatives that were voluntary organizations established by farmers themselves.
In 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture developed a pilot project with 100 FPCs
throughout China. These cooperatives received marketing information, technical
assistance, and management training. In November 2004, Zhejiang Province passed
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the first provincial law regulating the operation of “farmer professional cooperative
organizations”. The law, which took effect in January 2005, endowed FPCs with
legal status, put them under the leadership of the Agricultural Bureau at the county
level and above, and required that they register with the Industry and Commerce
Bureau (World Bank, 2006a).
On October 31, 2006, the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s
Republic of China adopted a law supporting FPCs. The law was later ratified by
President Hu Jintao as Order 57, which became effective on July 1, 2007. Article 1
stipulates the reasons for developing this special law: “Its purpose is to facilitate
and direct the development of farmer cooperatives, standardize organization and
behaviors of them, protect legal interests of cooperatives and members, and foster
growth of agricultural and rural economy.”
Article 8 of the new law states that the state shall boost the development of
FPCs by adopting measures regarding the support with state financial revenue,
preferential tax treatment, financial support, technical support, as well as guidance
in industrial policies. Government agencies at provincial and county level shall set
up agricultural administration departments to give guidance, support, and service to
the creation and development of FPCs. In other words, local authorities are
expected to take an active role in the establishment of new FPCs.
One of the key provisions of the new law deals with tax reduction. Cooperatives
do not have to pay VAT when selling inputs to their members. In addition,
customers buying from cooperatives pay 16% less tax (on the condition that these
buyers are registered companies).
Although the national law on FPCs was designed after the experiences and
structures of cooperatives in Europe and North America, some major deviations
were introduced. One of the interesting features is allowing non-farmers to
become member of the cooperative. Although at least 80% of all members should
be farmers, the non-farmer membership may include citizens, enterprises,
institutions, and social bodies that carry out production and operating activities in
direct connection with the business of the FPC. Government agencies are not
allowed to become members of an FPC. The rationale for allowing non-farmers to
become members of a cooperative lies in the common interest farmers and their
business partners have in building integrated supply chains and modernizing
agriculture.
The law states that each member has at least one vote. At the same time, the law
also allows individual members who account for a large share of the capital
contribution or of the volume of transactions with the FPC to enjoy additional voting
rights. The maximum voting rights one member can have is 20% of all votes. Thus,
the classical cooperative principle of one member–one vote does not apply.
Detailed figures on the number of cooperatives in China are not available.
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Deng et al. (2010) conclude that in 2008 more than 20% of all villages and county
towns in China had at least one FPC, which implies a total number of more than
210,000 FPCs, providing services to 24 million farmers. Deng et al. (2010) also
report a rapid increase in the number of villages with cooperatives, from 5% in
2004 to more than 10% in 2007 and almost 21% in 2008. They attribute this rapid
increase in recent years to the adoption and implementation of new national
legislation on FPCs.
Data on the number of FPCs in China must be interpreted with care because
not all cooperatives are formally registered (whereas a part of the formally
registered cooperatives are not active). From the total number of 212,000
cooperatives in 2008, around 12% were not formally registered (Deng et al.,
2010).
Survey data and descriptive analysis
Data on 198 marketing FPCs in Hubei Province were collected in July 2009. Our
sample is not a random sample of cooperatives in Hubei. The cooperatives
surveyed were attending training sessions organized by the Hubei Supervision
Office for Rural Professional Cooperative Organization (SORC). We interviewed
representatives (mainly chairpersons) of FPCs. Structured questionnaires were
used in these personal interviews.
To get acquainted with the organization and functions of newly established
marketing cooperatives in rural Hubei Province, the authors visited ten different
cooperatives in April 2009. During these visits, information was collected by
observation and personal interviews with chairmen and other leaders of
cooperatives. According to Hubei SORC, Hubei Province had 4357 FPCs
registered by June 30, 2009.4
Main products
The total number of 198 marketing cooperatives represented a broad spectrum of
agricultural and aquacultural products (Table 1). One-fifth of all cooperatives
were in vegetable production and another fifth were in fish production (including
turtles and salamanders). Table 1 also shows the average number of members in a
cooperative. While the average for all cooperatives is 237, there are considerable
differences by product category. The cooperatives marketing arable crops are the
largest, with an average membership of 561 farmers. Also the fish cooperatives
and the vegetable cooperatives are quite large in membership. If we compare
4 Presentation by Zhang Qinglin, director of the Hubei SORC, October 2009.
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these membership figures with the average for all China as calculated by Deng et
al. (2010), we see that the cooperatives in our sample are twice the national average
(237 versus 111).
Table 1. Main products of the cooperatives in the survey
Main product Number of coops
surveyed
% Average
membership
Vegetables 39 20 318
Arable crops 29 15 561
Fruits 15 8 131
Mushrooms 7 4 92
Others plants 2 1 79
Total plant products 92 46
Fish 37 19 240
Pigs 25 13 96
Poultry 23 12 111
Cattle 8 4 47
Rabbits 8 4 79
Bees 5 3 152
Total animal products 106 54
Total 198 100 237
Initiators of the new cooperatives
Most of the cooperatives in our survey were established recently, with the largest
numbers established in 2007(76 FPCs) and 2008 (85 FPCs). This development is
in line with the nation-wide trend of rapid growth in the number of cooperatives
as described by Deng et al. (2010). We also asked about the growth in number of
members, and found that all the cooperatives experienced substantial growth in
membership soon after their establishment. While the average number of members
at the establishment of the cooperative was 52, it had increased to 237 by the time of
the survey (July 2009).
In China the initiative for establishing a marketing cooperative can come from
many different persons or even companies. Table 2 provides details on who took
the lead in establishing the new marketing cooperatives in Hubei Province.
Besides producers themselves, who took the initiative in 19% of all cooperatives in
our sample, initiators for new marketing cooperatives in Hubei Province were rural
official (22%), brokers and traders (22%), processors of farm products (15%), and
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technical advisors (10%). Given that technical advisors are (or were) also state
employees, one third of all new cooperatives in our sample were initiated by a
governmental officials.
Table 2. Who initiated the establishment of the new cooperative
Initiator
Percentage of all
cooperatives (n=198)
Rural official 22
Broker, trader 22
Producer 19
Processor 15
Technical advisor 10
Other 9
Looking at the relationship between type of product and who took the initiative,
we found that fish marketing cooperatives were more often established by traders,
while arable crop cooperatives were more often established by owners or
managers of a processing plant. Both relationships were statistically
significant. The dominance of the traders in initiating fish cooperatives could be
explained by the crucial role of traders in the value chain to keep the time
between catch and consumption as short as possible, as fish is a highly perishable
product. The involvement of the processors in arable crop cooperatives can be
explained by the need for these companies to collect their raw material from a
large number of small producers. Also the tax reduction can be attractive for these
processors.
In addition, we found a marginally significant relationship between the category
of vegetables, fruits, and mushrooms and rural official as initiator. This could be
explained by the administrative pressure on officials to improve fresh produce
suply chains, such as supplying to supermarkets or even foreign markets.
Not all new cooperatives are established from scratch. We found that 32% of all
new FPCs had a predecessor that had been handling the same product. The new
cooperatives are substantially larger than their predecessors. While the original
farmer association had on average 110 members, the successor cooperative has on
average 448 members.
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Functions and assets
The key function of any agricultural cooperative is to provide services to its
members. These services support the on-farm activities of the members (in the
case of technical assistance and provision of inputs) or facilitate the sales of the
members’ products (in the case of sorting, grading, marketing, and processing).
Also a marketing cooperative indirectly supports on-farm activities as it allows
the producer to concentrate on farming activities and not spend time and effort on
maketing of farm products. While almost all the cooperatives in our sample were
engaged in marketing of the members’ products, marketing was not necessarily
their main activity. A substantial number of FPCs listed technical assistance as
their primary function. This is in line with the results reported by Deng et al.
(2010), who found that 91% of all FPCs provide technical assistance to their
members. As Table 3 shows, marketing and technical assistance are the main
services the Hubei cooperatives provide to their members. In addition, a
substantial number also supply inputs. A much smaller number of cooperatives
are engaged in (or attribute great importance to) sorting, quality grading, storage,
and packaging of members’ products.
Table 3. Main functions and services of the cooperatives
Function Mean score * Percent of
cooperatives that
scored the function
(n=198)
Marketing 1.8 98
Technical assistance 1.9 98
Providing inputs 2.7 88
Storage 3.5 38
Packaging 3.8 50
Sorting and quality grading 3.9 63
* On a scale of 1 (most important activity) to 6 (least important activity)
The marketing function can be executed by the cooperative in two ways.
First, the cooperative may act as a commission agent: the cooperative sells on
behalf of the farmer and receives a commission (in other words, charges a fee)
for this service. This type of marketing can be found across all products, although
it happens more often in fresh produce. Second, the cooperative may purchase
the products from the farmer, carry out some kind of sorting or processing
activity, and then sell the upgraded product. Under this arrangement, the farmer
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does not have to deal with the developments and requirements of the end-user
market, as the cooperative is basically its final customer. In our sample, in three-
quarters of all cooperatives producers sell to their cooperative, while in one-
quarter the cooperative acts as a commission agent brokering between farmer and
customer.
Cooperatives may own different assets. As noted above, the cooperatives
established under the new cooperative law are legal persons that are allowed to own
assets and enter into contracts with other parties. Table 4 shows the relative importance
of different types of assets in a cooperative. An administration building is the key asset
these cooperatives own. Second in importance is equipment, which includes
machinery for tillage, spraying, and harvesting as well as equipment for sorting and
packing farm products (the low numbers for storage, sorting, and packing assets
could be explained by the fact that respondents regard these assets as equipment).
Quite a number of cooperatives had joint facilities for the production of starting
material, such as seedlings for plant production and young animals for animal
production.
Table 4. Assets owned by the cooperative
Assets
Percent of cooperatives
(n=198)
Administration building 95
Equipment 54
Facilities for the production of seedlings
and young animals
43
Storage facilities 37
Sorting and packing station 35
Research and laboratory 24
Organizational issues
The cooperatives in our survey apply the governance rules as set by national and
provincial legislation on cooperatives. They all have a general assembly of
members, which convenes several times a year. There is a board of directors (often
called the council) and there may be a board of supervisors. The average size of the
board of directors is 5.5 members; the average size of the board of supervisors is
3 members. According to the law on cooperatives, the chairman of the board of
directors (or council president) may also act as the manager of the cooperative.
Decision-making in the board of directors uses a one-person–one-vote system.
Agricultural cooperatives in China are allowed to admit non-farmers as
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members. In our sample about one third of all cooperatives (64 out of 198) have
members who are not producers. These non-producer members are often salesmen
or traders (22 cases), technical advisors (20 cases), administrators (11 cases), or
processors (7 cooperatives)
An interesting feature of FPCs is the relationship between shareholders and
members. Not all members have to be shareholders. This means that the equity
capital of the cooperative is provided by a subset of the membership. In our
sample, 87% of the cooperatives issue shares. Almost all cooperatives (97%)
restrict shareholding to members. The distribution of these shares over the
different groups of members is fairly skewed. On average, 28% of all shares were
held by the chairman of the cooperative, while 61% of all shares were held by the
founding members. This group of founding members is only a small part of the
total membership. Thus, share-ownership is concentrated in the hands of the
founding members, with the chairman the largest shareholder. These findings for
Hubei Province are in line with the findings of Hu et al. (2007) on Zhejiang
Province.
The distribution of shares among the different groups of members is relevant
for the distribution of profit. Among the 114 cooperatives for which we received
information on profit distribution, the average distribution was as follows: 52% of
the profit was distributed according to deliveries (i.e., volume of transactions with
the cooperative); 36% of the profit was distributed according to shares; 11% of the
profit went into the reserve fund.
Performance and quality issues
Common economic performance indicators (e.g., profit) turned out to be
unreliable for assessing the performance of the surveyed cooperatives. As we
assumed that producers have become members of the cooperative primarily in
order to obtain a better price for their products, performance could be measured by
the price difference between what the cooperative pays and what alternative
buyers would pay. This is a valid measure in our setting, since the majority of the
cooperatives surveyed (70%) allow their members to sell outside the cooperative.
we asked about the difference between the price. The difference in price members
received from their cooperative and the price received when selling outside the
cooperative was on average 7% in favor of the cooperative: members received
from the cooperative 7% more than they received by selling outside the
cooperative.
Another performance indicator is the type of quality standard the cooperative
applies, the assumption being that better-performing cooperatives apply higher
quality standards. We asked the cooperatives what quality and food safety
standards they applied (Table 5). Three-quarters of the cooperatives apply the
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Pollution Free standard, which is the lowest standard for food products. Very few
cooperatives (5% only) sell under the Organic standard, which we consider the
highest food quality standard.
Table 5. Quality and food safety standards applied by the cooperative
Quality standards Ranking of
standard
Percent of cooperatives
(n=198)
Pollution Free Low 75
Green Medium 22
Organic High 5
Cooperatives help their members to improve product quality by providing
different services. Table 6 lists the quality-improving services provided by the plant
production cooperatives. As can be expected, technical assistance and training is
the most important service that cooperatives provide to their members. Second in
importance is the provision of market information, particularly information on the
quality requirements of the main customers. This issue of information exchange is
highly relevant in the context of linking small farmers to supermarkets as the latter
usually apply company-specific quality requirements.
Table 6. How does the coop help its members to improve
plant product quality?
Activity
Percent of coops
(n=92)
Provide technical assistance and training 97
Provide information on quality requirements of buyers 90
Supply of seeds and seedlings 80
Product sorting and grading 68
Supply of improved inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) 61
Product storage 43
Does support from the cooperative to its member for improving product quality
lead to a better performance, by the cooperative or by the members? We tested the
following hypotheses:
1. The more quality-improving services the cooperative offers to its members,
the higher the price the members will receive for their products.
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2. The more quality-improving services the cooperative offers to its members,
the higher the quality standard that the cooperative applies.
Hypothesis 1 was confirmed: the correlation coefficient between the level of
service provision and the observed price difference for members was positive and
statistically significant (r = 0.292, p = 0.009).
Hypothesis 2 was partly confirmed: more quality-improving services had a
positive effect on the application of the Green standard (r = 0.226, p = 0.033).
Another research question related to the impact of government support on
quality improvement. In other words, does government support to the cooperative
lead to higher product quality? Cooperatives receive several types of support from
government agencies. Table 7 shows that technical support is the leading type of
support these cooperatives receive from government agencies and almost half the
cooperatives receive managerial support.
Table 7. Types of support cooperatives receive from the government
Type of support
All cooperatives (n=198)
Only plant
cooperatives (n=92)
Technical support 59% 63%
Managerial support 48% 48%
Financial support 42% 40%
Quality management support 38% 30%
More government support leads to the application of a higher quality standard.
For plant cooperatives, more government support for the cooperative (Table 7) was
found to be positively related to the ranking of the quality standard the cooperative
applied (r = 0.258, p = 0.014). Separately, technical support, managerial support, and
financial support each had a positive impact on the ranking of the quality standard:
more support resulted in application of a higher ranked quality standard (Table 5).
Conclusion
Farmer cooperatives may provide the missing organizational link between
smallholder farmers and modern retail markets. In 2007, the Chinese government
enacted national legislation on promoting farmer professional cooperatives (FPCs)
as a major tool to strengthen the agricultural and rural economy. The law stipulates
that state agencies at provincial and county level should actively support the
establishment and development of marketing cooperatives. In our study area, the
Hubei Province in central China, the Department of Agriculture is actively
Jos Bijman1 and Dinghuan Hu112
promoting the development of FPCs. Our paper presents results of a survey among
198 agriculture and aquaculture marketing cooperatives in Hubei Province. Detailed
information on the organization, assets, activities, and performance of newly
established cooperatives in China has not been published before.
Although one of the basic organizational features of a cooperative is that it is
governed by the members, some groups of members may be more influential than
others. In the newly established cooperatives in Hubei Province, the chairman often
is an entrepreneurial person with a background in trade, food processing, or
extension services. These entrepreneurs have shown that they possess both the
social and the human capital needed for establishing a cooperative. The social
capital relates to their ability to negotiate with district officials about administrative
hurdles and about the kind and level of public support the cooperative will receive.
The human capital represents both their knowledge about production and
marketing and their ability to convince large groups of farmers to join the
organization they are managing.
Cooperatives in China issue shares, which can be held by both members and non-
members. The chairman of the cooperative is often the dominant shareholder (on
average 28% of the shares). Thus, the entrepreneur needs substantial financial
capital to become a major investor in the new cooperative.
The newly established cooperatives have shown rapid increases in their
membership. The membership rose from an average of 47 at the establishment (in
2007, 2008, or 2009) to an average of 237 in July 2009. Such rapid increase in
membership raises the question about how the process of becoming a member is
organized, and what role rural officials play in this process. Unfortunately, we have
no information to answer this question.
As to the quality performance of cooperative and members, our results provide
preliminary evidence that state support to cooperatives is positively related to higher
quality standards, and that cooperative support to its members leads to better
member performance, both in price and quality.
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